Thank you very much, Senator Feingold. We

appreciate the opportunity to testify and for your continuing concern

about this issue. All of us appreciate it deeply.

I come to you today with three simple messages. And in my eternal

dissatisfaction with my own written material, I am just going

to diverge from the text and tell you what I think.

The first message is that peace is possible now. The second message

is that the substance of that peace matters greatly. And the

third message is that we will not make peace in Sudan unless our

leverage is greatly increased over and above what it is now.

The first point, that peace is possible, flows from our assessment

at the International Crisis Group that an unprecedented window of

opportunity has opened up since September 11 for peace in Sudan,

and that a well designed peace process can be a crowbar to force

that window wider until a comprehensive peace agreement is

reached in Sudan.

Such a comprehensive peace, in turn, is really the best vehicle

for achieving all of the key U.S. objectives that you and that Walter

outlined earlier, including counter-terrorism, which means we need

to put more energy, more effort and more resources into that pursuit

of the peace process than we are in any of the other areas, because

it is the best guarantee for meeting our objectives.

The second point is that the substance of this comprehensive

peace matters greatly. Sudan is not a conflict among warlords over

spoils. There are real issues backed by fundamental principles for

which people are prepared to fight and die in large numbers.

And as Walter pointed out, there is one issue above all that

threatens to derail the peace in Sudan, the issue of self-determination

for Sudanese people.

Mr. Chairman, I travel frequently into southern Sudan and travel

all around that area, and I can tell you from personal experience

that the commitment of southerners to a self-determination referendum

grows stronger with each passing month, with each new

attack, and with each denial of access by Khartoum for humanitarian

aid deliveries.

The problem is that the mediators continue to underestimate this

sentiment, believing if they can get the SPLA to compromise on

this point, then the government will compromise on other issues

and they will come to closure.

In fact, the reverse is true. If the mediators, and the United

States as the key observer and a participant actually in the mediation,

if those mediators maintain strong support for the referendum,

the self-determination referendum, this will oblige the

SPLA to compromise on other issues and create the most important

internal pressure on Khartoum to implement whatever agreement

that it would make with the SPLA because it seeks to create a

more positive incentive for unity of the country.

At present, there are mixed signals from the United States and

others, and these have undercut this point of leverage in a great

degree. This stems from a desire to reassure Khartoum that the

unity of the country is not at risk.

Ironically, this attitude puts the unity of the country at greater

risk, as it further alienates southerners who almost universally feel

that they have suffered so much that they simply cannot compromise

on this fundamental issue, and are quite prepared to continue

the war no matter what odds they might face.

And this then leads us to the third point, that assuming we get

the objective right—in other words, assuming that the self-determination

referendum is fundamentally understood as a basic element

of the agreement. If we get that right, then we still do not

stand a ghost of a chance of having peace in Sudan until the U.S.

Government takes the lead in organizing and coordinating serious

pressures and incentives that will be deployed in the service of the

peace process.

My written testimony, which I have already submitted, is almost

entirely a toolbox of these pressures and incentives, so I have already

tried to outline all those. But I just want to highlight one

overarching point that you asked about earlier, Senator Feingold,

since we will not have time really to go into a list of these issues.

And the point is this: All of this leverage, all of the leverage that

we are talking about should be deployed in an all-or-nothing scenario.

In other words, when you normalize relations, lifting economic

sanctions, ending Sudan’s isolation, providing support through the

IMF and the World Bank, ending support to the opposition, and we

ought to increase it now, and ceasing any other meaningful pressure,

this should only occur when a comprehensive peace agreement

is being implemented.

And that approach has to be multi-lateralized to the maximum

extent. If President Bush’s clear indication of support for peace is

to be implemented seriously in Sudan, that requires high level of

diplomacy in Europe, Asia and the Middle East in an attempt to

unite key governments in a common effort toward peace in Sudan.

Senator Danforth can begin this next week with his trip and this

calls for—but this calls for the involvement of Secretary Powell and

Mr. Armitage more directly. That would be the measure of U.S.

commitment to peace in Sudan.

Thanks very much.

In the last two decades of Sudan’s civil war, there have been few hopeful moments,

and few windows of opportunity for making peace. In the aftermath of the

September 11 terrorist attacks, one of those moments arrived, and the window of

opportunity for peace opened. For a number of reasons, however, the window is closing

quickly. If more serious leverage is not immediately brought to bear on the warring

parties in the context of the current peace talks taking place in Kenya, the window

will slam shut, condemning the Sudanese people to cumulative levels of death

and destruction with few parallels to any conflict since World War II.

The U.S. has a number of fundamental policy objectives in Sudan: countering terrorism,

promoting human rights and democracy, ending the war, and supporting humanitarian

assistance. All of these objectives are best addressed through a comprehensive

peace agreement which both reforms the central government and provides

for the exercise of self-determination for southern Sudanese.

More than any other country in the world, the U.S. has the ability to move the

Sudan peace process forward. The U.S. has decided to focus on making the IGAD

process in Kenya a more serious one. So far, U.S. efforts have been useful but by

no means sufficient. This is why today’s hearing is so timely.

In the topsy-turvy debate over Sudan policy, the very idea of a negotiated settlement

has come under fire by those who see negotiating with the Khartoum government

as useless. That may be proven true, but in the absence of a new U.S. policy

objective which has not yet been formulated, such a view abandons the Sudanese

people, particularly southerners, to endless war. In fact, southern Sudanese are prepared

to continue the war indefinitely in the absence of a just peace, a factor that

continues to be underestimated by mediators. But as long as an opportunity exists

to end the conflict through the conclusion of a comprehensive peace agreement, we

must urgently and diligently pursue that objective.

To be clear, in order for peace efforts to have a chance of succeeding, the objective

of the negotiations must emphasize a just settlement. There are indications from the

ongoing talks in Kenya that mediators and observers are pulling back from support

for self-determination in the form of a referendum with the full complement of options,

including independence. It cannot be emphasized enough that southern Sudanese

will continue the war, no matter what the cost or the outlook, if this fundamental

element of any potential solution is not part of the deal in some form. Modalities

can certainly be negotiated, but the essential principle appears to be under

assault, and this guarantees the failure of the negotiations. It is not too late to rectify

this.

Because the divergent positions of the parties are so entrenched, it is unlikely

that they can be reconciled through conventional facilitation alone. More forceful

diplomatic intervention—of which leverage is the key element—will be required

than is currently envisioned. Therefore, the most visible missing ingredient of a potentially

successful IGAD peace effort is coordination of pressures and incentives.

Leverage does not grow on trees. It is created through leadership in the development

of a multilateral strategy of carrots and sticks, and its judicious execution. Despite

the influence the U.S. actually possesses over the warring parties, American

diplomats have frequently claimed in the past that they lack the leverage to move

the parties toward peace. Such claims increase perceptions among Sudanese parties

that the leverage the U.S. does in fact enjoy will not be used during the negotiations—perceptions that in fact reduce outside leverage in the manner of a self-fulfilling

prophecy.

To be effective, pressures and incentives must be multilateral. As the actor with

the most potential leverage and the only one whom all Sudanese parties believe can

make peace, the U.S. should take the lead in organizing the judicious and tactically

opportune application of these carrots and sticks. This may be the single most important

contribution the U.S. can make. Leverage can be increased both through actions

and positions taken in the context of the peace process, and through wider

policies pursued by the U.S. Both are discussed below. All of these require U.S.

leadership but would have much greater effect if pursued—through the G-8, EU and

other bodies—with our European allies as well as with other countries with influence.

The peace process itself provides a number of opportunities for the U.S. to increase

its leverage on the parties in support of peace:

Support Self-Determination: U.S. support for the right of self-determination

for the southern Sudanese people—in the form of a referendum with the full

scope of possible outcomes—provides the single most important point of leverage

on both parties for moving them toward a negotiated settlement. In the absence

of U.S. support for this position, the SPLA eventually either will walk away

from the talks or at best make no meaningful compromises on any other issue,

and the Khartoum government will have no incentive to compromise as well,

as it will get what it wants without giving anything up. On the other hand, U.S.

support for self-determination will oblige the SPLA to compromise on other

issues, while creating the most important internal pressure on Khartoum to implement

whatever agreement it makes with the opposition in order to create the

strongest case for maintaining a unified Sudan. At present, mixed signals from

the U.S. and others have undercut this point of leverage, and it is clear that

the mediators underestimate the depth of southern Sudanese sentiment in support

of an independence referendum.

Include the Northern Opposition: No agreement can be truly comprehensive

if it does not involve or gain the acceptance of the political parties that comprise

the bulk of the Sudanese electorate. Northern opposition parties in the umbrella

National Democratic Alliance, as well as the Umma Party, should be involved

more directly in the IGAD process. Their inclusion will act as a moderating influence

on the Khartoum government and the SPLA, and will better position

all actors to support the implementation of any agreement. Until now, the U.S.

and the IGAD states have not made the widening of the process a priority.

Strategize With the IGAD Neighbors: When the U.S. was closely coordinating

its Sudan policy with Ethiopia, Eritrea and Uganda, additional leverage

was generated which resulted in the acceptance by Khartoum of the IGAD Declaration

of Principles. Now that the Eritrea-Ethiopia war is concluded, it is time

again to make a concerted effort to reconstruct the partnership and focus it on

bringing about a negotiated solution to the Sudan conflict. This requires more

focused, consistent and high level U.S. diplomacy than that deployed currently.

Strategize With Egypt: Understandably, focus on Egyptian policy has centered

on its inflexible opposition to any discussion of southern self-determination,

a damaging position that limits Egypt’s role in any peace process. Less understood,

however, is Egypt’s underutilized leverage that it could apply particularly

on Khartoum. Egypt has a vested interest in a reformed Sudanese state,

with a more moderate government. If strongly and consistently engaged at high

levels by the U.S., it could be a partner eventually in developing and providing

the kinds of serious concessions and guarantees that the Khartoum government

must accept to make unity desirable to southern Sudanese. The U.S. also must

have the hard discussions with Egypt, again at very high levels, on the Egyptian

posture regarding self-determination.

Strategize With the EU: The U.S. should work at high levels to convince

the EU that normalization of its relations with Khartoum should be made contingent

solely on implementation of a comprehensive peace agreement, rather

than on achievement of numerous short-term individual humanitarian and

human rights benchmarks as is currently the case. Senator Danforth’s upcoming

trip to Europe would be an ideal opportunity to initiate greater efforts in

this regard.

Include the Pentagon: U.S. leverage with both parties is enhanced by the

degree to which the U.S. Defense Department is perceived to be backing the

process in a tangible way. To wit, one of the most effective elements of the successful

U.S. effort to resolve the Eritrea-Ethiopia war was to include U.S. military

officers as part of the U.S. negotiating team, and to allow the team to travel

on U.S. military aircraft. Pentagon support for U.S. involvement in the Sudanese

peace process in the form of personnel and logistics is non-existent at

present, and would be similarly useful now, even more so after September 11.

Issue an Ultimatum: High level U.S. officials should make clear a basic reality

of U.S. domestic politics: if Khartoum obstructs the peace process and is

the reason for its demise, the U.S. will have no choice but to walk away from

the engagement required of a peace process and escalate its policy against the

government, with very uncertain outcomes given the increasing frustration of

the American constituency on Sudan. The SPLA should be equally warned that

if it is responsible for collapsing the talks it will find far less sympathy in

Washington for its cause.

Beyond the leverage available through the peace process itself, there are other

key pressures and incentives the U.S. has at its disposal. The points of leverage

should be deployed solely in the pursuit of a comprehensive peace agreement, not

frittered away for lesser or incremental objectives, in other words, normalizing relations,

lifting economic sanctions, ending Sudan’s isolation, support in the Bretton

Woods Institutions, ending support to the opposition, and any other meaningful

pressures should only occur when the parties begin implementing the comprehensive

peace agreement that they sign. The following is an inventory of existing or potential

pressures and incentives that, if multilateralized, could make in an impact

on the calculations of the warring parties.

Pressures on the government:

It is critical for the U.S. to maintain counter-terrorism pressure on Khartoum.

This has provided the most potent leverage on Khartoum’s policies in the aftermath

of September 2001, since the Sudanese government remains uncertain

what the U.S. may yet do as it pursues its declared global war on terrorism.

This is particularly salient with regard to Pentagon calculations. Short-term

tactical cooperation from Khartoum should not be confused with strategic redirection,

which will only be ensured through the kind of change that can be expected

to accompany a comprehensive peace agreement which reforms the central

government.

Continuing opposition to aid in the International Financial Institutions (IMF

and World Bank) make it extremely difficult for the Sudanese government to

rehabilitate its formal economy, making this, therefore, a very effective form of

leverage. Most crucial is the huge debt overhang, one of the largest in the

world, that if not addressed will continue to be a major obstacle to economic

development and lending. The government needs to get back in a full program

with the IIMF in order to enter the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program

to qualify for serious debt relief U.S. votes on the IMF Board have so far

prevented Sudan from moving too far up the IMF ladder. The U.S. should continue

to block aid to Sudan in these institutions until a comprehensive peace

agreement is concluded. Ultimately, Sudan’s economic recovery depends on an

end to the civil war, and nothing should be done to alter that fact prematurely.

Pressure on investors in the oil industry translates into indirect pressure on the

Sudanese government, which is heavily dependent on the revenues it receives

from that sector. Passage of the Sudan Peace Act would thus provide an important

leverage point, because it would deny critical capital markets to oil firms

operating in Sudan. Pressure on the Canadian firm Talisman and other Western

oil companies that are considering starting new operations in Sudan is particularly

critical because these enterprises possess technology that would enable

the rapid expansion of oil production. Only Talisman and other Western firms

have this technology, and thus Khartoum is heavily dependent upon them to

unlock the full potential for oil development in the country.

Secretary O’Neill recently reiterated Bush administration opposition to capital

market sanctions, saying, ‘‘A better way to deal with Sudan is to say no one

should do any business with Sudan full stop.’’ If the Secretary is speaking for

the administration, this would entail two actions on the part of the U.S. We

should close the exemption on importing Sudanese gum arabic, Sudan’s biggest

export to the U.S. And we should go to other countries currently doing business

in Sudan and ask them to suspend their trade and investment, or to invoke unilateral

sanctions just as the U.S. has done. This involves European partners

like the UK, Germany and Switzerland, as well as other governments that are

investing heavily in and selling arms to Sudan, such as China, Malaysia and

Russia.

Increased effort could be expended on investigating and highlighting the issue

of government corruption associated with oil development. Shining a spotlight

on excesses to the domestic Sudanese audience could increase accountability.

The U.S. could express support for the recently launched ‘‘Publish What You

Pay’’ NGO campaign which aims for companies to disclose their payments to developing

countries.

Various forms and levels of aid to opposition and/or civil society elements represent

a potentially significant lever. The continuum begins with democracy-and

peace-building assistance to the SPLA/NDA and/or civil society groups. In and

of itself, this has a positive impact on the morale of those struggling for change

in Sudan, and helps sustain their struggles. Moving along the continuum, support

for the democratic administration of opposition-controlled areas could demonstrate

that alternative governance can be better. Further along the continuum,

communication and transportation aid could be provided for the protection

of civilian populations in the south, east and south-center (Nuba Mountains

and Southern Blue Nile) who are subject to the worst vestiges of the government’s

war tactics such as forced displacement, slave raiding, and repeated aerial

bombing by Antonov or helicopter gunship.

Opposition to Sudan’s status in the World Trade Organization until it reaches

a comprehensive peace agreement would also frustrate efforts to reduce economic

isolation prematurely.

Much more robust and higher level diplomatic efforts could be expended on reducing

the unimpeded flow of arms to the Sudan government, which remains

on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. Under the Wassenar Agreement,

Eastern European countries voluntarily pledge to maintain certain standards

for arms transactions. Sales to Sudan certainly do not meet those standards,

and higher level and more public U.S. diplomacy should be deployed to counter

these sales, especially during the peace process. U.S. officials at the highest levels

should also engage China on its burgeoning arms sales to Khartoum.

Maintenance of international efforts to isolate Khartoum continues to be an irritant

to the government, meaning that every move they make in international

forums is a source of difficulty or controversy. Its defeat in its quest for a seat

on the UN Security Council in 2000 was a bitter one for the government, and

U.S. unilateral sanctions remains as stigma and economic hindrances.

Incentives for the government:

Key incentives aimed at Khartoum could include the following:

Sudan is eager to reduce its debt and improve its economy as the government’s

abidance to IMF-approved shadow structural adjustment programs attests. Removing

U.S. opposition to Paris Club financing, IMF lending, and World Bank

credits for Sudan when a peace agreement is concluded probably would be the

largest incentive the U.S. could offer. This would open the door to HIPC for

Sudan, a key to unleashing it economic potential.

Sudan used to be one of the largest recipients of U.S. non-emergency foreign

aid; today it receives none. Implementation of a future peace agreement would

usher in a new era of improved U.S.-Sudan ties and once again make Sudan

eligible for foreign assistance. Rather than uncoordinated bilateral assistance

and promises of aid to the post-war reconstruction of the south, the U.S. should

work with international donors to create a Sudan Reconstruction Trust Fund

aimed at national reconstruction, from which both the north and the south

could benefit.

Sudan wants a full-fledged U.S. embassy in Khartoum. An increased U.S. embassy

presence in Khartoum will allow the U.S. to better monitor the government

of Sudan and put personal diplomatic pressure on Khartoum to implement

a comprehensive peace agreement and reduce human rights abuses.

Ending efforts to isolate Sudan in international forums is an important objective

of the regime, whether it is removing opposition to a seat on the Security

Council, removal of U.S. unilateral sanctions and designation as a state sponsor

of terrorism, or unlocking foreign assistance and debt relief. The government of

Sudan is eager to legitimize and reintegrate itself within the international community.

Potential large-scale U.S. corporate investment in the development of the oil

sector would be a major boost to the government’s exploration and exploitation

plans. Although Khartoum’s oil efforts can continue without U.S. company participation, the involvement of U.S. majors is perceived as ideal. Lifting U.S. unilateral

sanctions at the conclusion of an agreement would unlock U.S. investment

in the oil sector.

Pressures on the SPLA:

There generally are fewer levers of pressure on opposition groups than on governments,

but sticks aimed at the SPLA include the following:

A major effort could be undertaken to try to reduce arms transfers to the SPLA

if it is perceived to be obstructing or collapsing the peace process. This would

include pressuring regional arms suppliers as well as invoking the Wassenar

Agreement as is suggested above in the government pressures section.

Regional governments and the United States are the key political supporters of

the opposition. At key junctures in the negotiations, it will be crucial for these

actors to be willing to apply diplomatic pressure on the SPLA to participate constructively

in peace talks.

Through the UN Operation Lifeline Sudan, the SPLA’s relief arm, the Sudan

Relief and Rehabilitation Association, is a member of the tripartite agreement

between the government, SPLA and UN. If the SPLA becomes the obstacle to

a peaceful settlement of the conflict, the treatment of the SPLA/SRRA within

the OLS framework should be reconsidered and downgraded.

Any institution-building support for the SPLA/NDA and its civil administration

capacity should be terminated if the SPLA becomes the obstacle to a peaceful

settlement.

African countries that support the SPLA and NDA militarily have the most leverage

over the opposition. This leverage should be utilized in support of the

peace process and the objective of a comprehensive peace agreement.

Incentives for the SPLA:

There are also fewer incentives for the opposition, but carrots for the SPLA might

include:

Promises of regional and international support for the implementation of whatever

emerges in a comprehensive peace agreement are the most important incentives

for the opposition. For example, an international observer force will be

key in guaranteeing the peace, external monitoring of any wealth sharing agreements

will be needed to ensure implementation, and human rights monitoring

will be required to guard against continuing abuses or retribution.

The creation of a major blueprint for the reconstruction of the south, including

governance, infrastructure, and social safety nets, will be a major incentive for

southern negotiators and—if widely advertised—will be an element of popular

accountability for the SPLA to negotiate in good faith.

Yes. On the flip side, the incentives for why

should they conclude a peace agreement, I think on the government

side, Steve earlier talked about the pie being small and shrinking

in the context of continued conflict. In the context of the peace

agreement, I do not think it doubles, Steve. I think it quadruples

minimally because of the kind—the real mother lode of the oil deposits

that are further south in the heart of the conflict areas now.

So the pie expands so dramatically that everyone gets access if

it is structured in a way that people do not feel they are going to

get cut out, those that are now feeding at the trough.

Second, the government will enter the community of nations

fully, that they do not participate in now. There is still a partial

isolation, a cloud hanging over Sudan everywhere they go because

of the United States, which we ought to maintain and increase

every time they bomb, every time they do anything that acts contrary

to the Geneva Conventions.

That entering fully into the community of nations is sought

greatly by certain elements of the government. Others do not care,

would rather just go work with China and see what they could do

with some of the allies they already have.

A third reason why the government would want to go forward in

a peace agreement would be that slowly—these kinds see the handwriting

on the wall. They are students of history. They know no

government lasts forever.

And they see—they watched Milosevic go. They saw what happened

to those in Afghanistan after September 11, watched how

fast that regime fell.

And they see that, in fact, if they maintain this one-foot-in-andone-

foot-out kind of a policy that this is not going to last forever

and that economic rehabilitation in Sudan solely depends on the

consummation of a peace deal.

As long as that economy erodes, the formal economy erodes, they

are grabbing the money. That is for sure. People are getting rich.

But the formal economy is eroding. As long as that erodes, the ability

for them to hold power with such a small support base deteriorates.

And at the end of the day, they are not going to control and

manage the process of their departure. And they do not want that.

On the SPLA side, well, again, it is the flip side of what Steve

was saying. They are not getting anything out of anything right

now. In a peace deal, certainly if it is done properly, revenue sharing,

there is going to be great gains to be made for both, by both,

for individuals but also, more importantly, for the communities in

the South, for the reconstruction of the South.

But much more importantly than that—that is a side show, and

Steve is right. You know, a revenue sharing plan will flow from the

central issues, not drive them. Access to governing at the center in

a reformed Sudanese state is where they want to be.

And I think that has been the case. People want to either be able

to help determine the future of the Sudan state from the South, determine

the future of a united Sudan state or they want the right

to walk away. And they will fight for that. And there is not going

to be any peace agreement until that is codified in a peace agreement.

I think the rhetoric is purely that of talking

about Jihad in the North, and talking about ‘‘Just hold on. We will

win this war’’ in the South. Neither side believes that they can win.

I do not think they need to be disabused of that notion although,

again, the public rhetoric will seem contrary.

I think both of them can maintain, though, their current levels

of fighting: On the SPLA side, because of the manpower advantages;

on the government side, because of the weapons advantages,

purchasing from oil wealth. They can sustain this conflict, this low

to medium intensity conflict, indefinitely. Internal power struggles,

potential internal power struggles probably pose more of a threat

to their rule than any other external or the war itself, and so I

think—you know, I do not think we need to—I think they are very

realistic about the limitations of the military card in the context of

changing the situation in Sudan.

Well, I think the timeline is yesterday. We

have argued that the aftermath of September 11—you saw the

graph. The leverage in the part, or on the part of the United States

was at its highest point in those few months after, because Khartoum

simply did not know what we were going to do in the next

step on the war on terrorism, and they still do not know.

In the visits that I have made to Khartoum, there is a lot of uncertainty

about particularly what the Defense Department’s role in

all this is going to be. And that is why we argue in the testimony

that the Pentagon will directly be involved in the visible element

of U.S. policy. When Senator Danforth travels to Khartoum, he

ought to be on a U.S. military plane. He ought to have American

officers with him, colonels.

And when we did the peace process in Ethiopia and Eritrea, one

of the most effective elements of our peace strategy was having

Pentagon people. They start every meeting with a full military

briefing to demonstrate to everybody they knew exactly what was

going on. Nobody was going to pull any wool over anybody’s eyes.

We knew as much as they knew about their own deployment of

forces, and what their calculations were. It gives great credibility

to what you are doing on the ground diplomatically. And the Pentagon

is non-existent in this whole process. We need to get them

involved in a significant way. So I think there is a lot of things we

can do to enhance our own leverage. And even though yesterday

was the best day to have started to move on this stuff, it is not too

late now.

But the window is closing, I think, the longer Khartoum sees

they can string everybody along with this, you know, mediocre cooperation

on the counter-terrorism and see very little to no repercussions.

You kept asking, and so did Senator Frist and Senator

Brownback, about what are the repercussions when they do x, y

and z? There are not any.

What you do see, what the response keeps coming back as is,

‘‘Well, we do not improve the bilateral relationship.’’ So it is a negative.

So we have got to do more in terms of escalating

and building that leverage and then coordinating with our

allies.

One of the key missing ingredients of the

peace process now is that 75 percent of the electorate of Sudan in

the last election represented in Umma, the Democratic Unionist

Party, and other northern political parties in Sudan, are not at the

table.

This is clearly going to be a very, very difficult sell, one—even

if you got a peace agreement, then to implement it, and one of the

problems of the 1972 peace agreement, was you did not—it was

amongst the armed groups, not the civil population.

And so I think at a minimum, there have to be meaningful approaches

to include—more inclusively bring the views of the northern

political parties into the process, and the northern and southern

civil society elements. That can be done in many different

ways.

I think we have shared a number of ideas with the facilitation

team in Nairobi about doing that. They are considering that. It is

late again. All of this stuff should have been done yesterday, because

if we lose a point of leverage—you bring the northern political

parties and the northern and southern civil society groups into

the process, and you create a moderating influence on the extreme

positions of the armed actors. In the absence of their involvement,

you are going to see that continuing divergence, I think. So even

bringing them in a consultative way brings the possibility of moderating

positions on the part of both of the armed actors.